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Abstract—From June 2019 to March 2020, IETF conducted a
selection process to choose password authenticated key exchange
(PAKE) protocols for standardization. Similar standardization
efforts were conducted before by IEEE (P1362.2) and ISO/IEC
(11770-4). An important hallmark for this IETF selection process
is its openness: anyone can nominate any candidate; all reviews
are public; all email discussions on the IETF mailing lists are
archived and publicly readable. However, despite the openness,
it is unclear whether this IETF selection process has presented
a successful model. Several important questions that were raised
during the selection process had remained unaddressed even after
the two winners (CPace and OPAQUE) were announced. We
reflect on the IETF PAKE selection process as a case study, and
summarize lessons in a set of principles with the hope to improve
security standardization in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
On 1 June 2019, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
started an open process to select password authenticated key
exchange (PAKE) protocols for standardization. This pro-
cess was coordinated by the Crypto Forum Research Group
(CFRG), which is a research group under the Internet Re-
search Task Force (IRTF) with the task to provide advice on
cryptography to many activities in IETF. After ten months
of public reviews and discussions, the selection process was
concluded on 20 March 2020. Two winners were announced:
CPace [6] and OPAQUE [11] for balanced and augmented
PAKEs respectively.
An important hallmark for this IETF PAKE selection pro-
cess is its openness. Anyone could nominate any candidate.
Nominators needed to answer a set of pre-defined questions
to address how the nominated candidates would meet the
expected criteria. Researchers from both academia and in-
dustry were invited to review the nominated candidates and
to provide feedback. All the collected reviews were openly
accessible on a public Github repository (https://github.com/
cfrg/pake-selection). Follow-up discussions on the CFRG mail
list were archived and publicly readable. A CFRG review
panel was formed to oversee the whole selection process.
Memberships in the panel were voluntary (subject to the
approval by the CFRG chairs).
The selection process was split into two rounds. In the
first round, reviewers were invited to openly comment on the
nominated candidates. Based on the collected comments, four
members in the CFRG review panel (Tackmann, Smyshlyaev,
Housley and Sheffer) wrote their own reviews, and decided
which candidates should be chosen to proceed to the next
round. No panel summary was provided apart from the four
separate reviews, but the selection result was clearly based on
the majority view among the four panel members. Nominators
of the remaining candidates were asked to answer additional
questions raised during the first-round review. Their answers
were examined by additional reviewers in the second round.
Finally, a slightly different review panel (Tackmann, Hesse,
Housley, Fluhrer) provided four final reviews, based on which
the winners were chosen. Again, no panel summary was
provided for this round, but the final decision was clearly based
on majority voting among the four panel members.
This selection process can be compared with previous
similar standardisation efforts by IEEE (P1362.2) and ISO/IEC
(11770-4). During the IEEE P1363.2 PAKE standardization
project (2000-2008), access to documents and discussions
was restricted to registered members only. As for ISO/IEC,
standard documents are not freely available and the meetings
are usually attended by national body delegates only. However,
despite the openness of the IETF selection process, it is
unclear whether it has presented a successful model. Neither
of the two winning protocols (CPace and OPAQUE) was fully
specified when they were chosen as winners. Several important
questions that were raised during the selection process had
remained unaddressed even after the winners were announced.
In this paper, we present a retrospective review of the
IETF selection process, and summarize lessons in the hope
that similar standardization activities can be improved in the
future. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the background of PAKE research. Section III gives
an overview of the IETF PAKE selection process with the
focus to explain details of the two winners. In Section IV,
we draw lessons from the IETF selection process, and present
a set of principles as prudent practices in security standard-
ization. Section VI provides further discussions on why these
principles were sidestepped in the IETF selection process and
the latest developments. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND ON PAKE
A password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol
is a technique that allows two parties to establish a high-
entropy session key based on a shared low-entropy secret
(e.g., a memorable password) without requiring any trusted
third parties. The first PAKE protocol, called Encrypted Key
Exchange (EKE), was proposed by Bellovin and Merritt in
1992 [3]. In the next 30 years, many other protocols were
proposed [2], [6], [8], [9], [11], [13].
PAKE protocols can be categorized into two types: balanced
and augmented PAKE. A balanced PAKE assumes two parties
share a common password. When designing J-PAKE, Hao
and Ryan summarized four main requirements for a balanced
PAKE in 2008, including “offline dictionary resistance”, “for-
ward secrecy”, “known-session security” and “online dictio-
nary attack resistance” [8]. The same requirements were later
formalized in a model in 2015 due to Abdalla et al. [14]. The
real-world deployments of J-PAKE in the past decade (secure
sync and IoT commissioning) suggest that these requirements
are realistic and meet the real-world needs.
An augmented PAKE differs from a balanced PAKE by
adding an extra requirement called “server compromise re-
sistance”: namely, when the server is compromised, the at-
tacker should not be able to use the stolen credential to
impersonate a client to the server without first performing
an offline dictionary attack. However, when the server is
compromised, an offline dictionary attack is inevitable. Hence,
all passwords need to be updated regardless what augmented
PAKE scheme is used. OPAQUE [11] further adds another
requirement called “pre-computation resistance”. Under this
requirement, an attacker should perform a (standard) offline
dictionary attack without being able to use pre-computed
tables to speed up the search. This increases the attacker’s
effort, but cannot prevent the password in plaintext to be
uncovered. From this perspective, the real assurance for “pre-
computation resistance” is limited.
As a trade-off for the (limited) resistance when the server
is compromised, an augmented PAKE requires a registration
phase that must be done within a pre-existing secure channel.
In the example of OPAQUE, if the registration data is sent
over a network and is eavesdropped by a passive attacker,
the password will be trivially broken by an offline dictionary
attack. By comparison, in a balanced PAKE, the shared secret
can be communicated using a low-bandwidth out-of-band
channel, e.g., reading a short code displayed on one device and
entering it to another device or reading it out to another person
over the phone. In OPAQUE, the registration phase involves
exchanging long strings of data between the client and the
server, which cannot be done over an out-of-band channel. The
OPAQUE authors justify this design choice [11], “In this way
the server never sees the user’s password, a major benefit, for
example to avoid accidental storage of plaintext passwords that
has affected also security conscious companies”. OPAQUE
recommends using SSL/TLS to perform registration, but this
will reduce arguably the biggest benefit of PAKE: namely,
being free from any Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). We will
explain more details on OPAQUE in Section III.
III. IETF PAKE SELECTION
A. Overview
The call for an IETF PAKE selection process followed
after the completion of the TLS 1.3 specification. TLS 1.3
is primarily designed for enabling secure communication be-
tween client browsers and remote servers based on a pre-
existing PKI. However, there are many applications, where
secure communication is strongly demanded but a PKI does
not exist, e.g., Internet of Things (IoT). Creating a new PKI
for IoT will be tremendously difficult. Although TLS 1.3 has a
pre-shared key (PSK) mode that allows two parties to establish
secure communication based on a shared secret, in a typical
IoT application, the two remote devices can only share a
low-entropy secret (e.g., a short memorable code). When a
low-entropy secret is used, the PSK mode is insecure, being
vulnerable to offline dictionary attacks. Hence, PAKE naturally
rises as a compelling solution when a PKI is unavailable (or
not securely operational).
Eight PAKE protocols were submitted to this IETF selection
process. Table I summarizes the main features of these pro-
tocols. Here, we use published papers as primary sources for
the analysis (except BSPAKE which has no formal publica-
tion). During the selection process, IETF Internet Drafts (ID)
documents were created with the aim to fully specify CPace
and OPAQUE, but these ID documents kept evolving and had
remained unpublished even when the selection process was
finished. Note that the content of an ID document is not fixed
unless it is published. Therefore, we will refer to these ID
documents only when additional clarification is needed.
We should highlight one particular ID document entitled
“Usage of PAKE with TLS 1.3” (current version 4, dated
16 July, 2018) by Barnes and Friel. This ID document was
frequently cited during the IETF PAKE selection process as
an authoritative reference for the usage of PAKE in TLS 1.3. In
this document, the authors state: “It must be possible to execute
in one round-trip, with the client speaking first” (draft-barnes-
tls-pake-04). The goal of minimizing communication rounds,
and hence latency, is totally reasonable, however, the question
is whether the word “must” is overly assertive in a general
context. According to this requirement, certain candidates
such as J-PAKE (3 flows, hence 1.5 round-trips) had been
disqualified automatically even before the selection began.
In the following, we will explain technical features of the
submitted candidates in terms of round-efficiency, dependence
on trusted setup (TS) and dependence on hash-to-curve (H2C).
Round efficiency. In a two/multi-party computation system,
a “round” is defined as a step in which all participants can
complete operations without depending on each other. Among
all candidates, only SPEKE, in both the original [9] and the
revised [7] versions, is one-round (which can be implemented
in 2 flows). The difference between the two versions is that
the revised SPEKE patches all known attacks reported on
the original SPEKE without changing round efficiency. (The
revised version has been included into the ISO/IEC 11770-
4:2016 standard.) SPAKE2 is a 2-round protocol, which can
be implemented in two flows (note that it is not 1-round since
the order of the user identities in the input to the key derivation
function implies that the two flows cannot be completed in one
round). Similarly, OPAQUE is a 2-round protocol, which can
be implemented in 2 flows. J-PAKE is a 2-round protocol,
which can be implemented in 3 flows. From the perspective
of round efficiency, SPAKE2, SPEKE and OPAQUE require
the minimum number of flows and satisfy the “one round-trip”
requirement stated by Barnes and Friel. CPace claims to be
“one round” (two flows) during the selection process, but this
claim is based on incorrect assumptions. It actually requires
3 rounds (3 flows) based on the description in the published
paper [6]. We will explain CPace in more detail later.
Trusted setup. Several protocols including SPAKE2,
VTBPEKE and BSPAKE depend on a trusted setup. More
specifically, the security of these protocols critically depends
on the discrete logarithm (DL) relationship between two base
generators in the system setup being unknown. SPAKE2 [2]
uses three base generators (denoted g, M and N in the
paper); the DL relationship between any two of them must
remain unknown to anyone. If a DL relationship is known,
the protocol is completely broken. Note that if an attacker
manages to discover the DL relationship, they will keep it
secret and hence gain exclusive power to break key exchange
sessions without anyone else knowing.
Hash-to-curve. Several protocols including CPace,
OPAQUE, AuCPace and BSPAKE, critically rely on a
hash-to-curve (H2C) function to securely map an arbitrary
string to a random point on a designated elliptic curve. It is
further assumed that this mapping is a constant-time operation
and incurs little cost. To date there is no general solution to
perform such secure mapping for elliptic curves (one that was
proposed in Dragonfly and implemented in WPA3 has been
shown insecure by Vanhoef and Ronen in IEEE S&P’20).
Instead, an Internet Draft (ID) document (draft-irtf-cfrg-
hash-to-curve) was created trying to define a custom-built
H2C solution for each of the ten selected elliptic curves.
Consequently, any protocol that relies on this ID document
has the specification and the implementation detail inevitably
mixed together. Each of the 10 custom-built H2C functions
is essentially a new security primitive on its own, and their
security needs to be reviewed and established separately.
During the selection process, the H2C ID document kept
evolving and had remained unpublished when the PAKE
selection process was finished. We note that it is not possible
to establish properties of a new security primitive unless its
specification is fully defined and fixed. From this perspective,
the H2C function remained uninstantiated throughout the
selection process.
The critical reliance on an unpublished H2C ID document
creates two major problems. First, as H2C was not instan-
tiated, the specifications of CPace and OPAQUE remained
incomplete when they had been chosen for standardization.
The second problem is causing ambiguity in the protocol
specification. In the original CPace [6] and OPAQUE [11]
papers, both protocols are described using notations for a
multiplicative group over a finite field (FF), e.g., using modular
exponentiations with respect to a large prime modulus. This is
common practice in the cryptographic literature. The implicit
assumption is that the same protocol can be implemented
in an elliptic curve (EC) setting, e.g., by changing modular
exponentiations to scalar multiplications. However, because
of the critical reliance on H2C, this means both protocols
were undefined in the FF setting (Table I). As for the EC
setting, the specifications of both protocols were incomplete
due to the H2C primitive not concretely instantiated. During
the PAKE selection process, several reviewers simply counted
the number of modular exponentiations as described in the
CPace and OPAQUE papers without realizing that the two
protocols were undefined in this FF setting.
We note that it is possible to define CPace and OPAQUE
in an FF setting, e.g., by following SPEKE [7], [9] which
uses a safe prime as the modulus and a square operation
to map a hashed string to a group element (this achieves
a similar effect as H2C in an FF setting). If the designers
had done so, it will be explicitly clear that both protocols
are in fact rather inefficient compared to others – e.g., for
a typical 2048-bit modulus p, one modular exponentiation
(mod p) in CPace and OPAQUE will be about 9 times costly
as that in J-PAKE due to the use of long exponents [8]. This
shows the importance of having a complete specification to
give a full picture. Simply counting the number of modular
exponentiation without the underlying group fully specified
can be misleading. We will describe CPace and OPAQUE in
more detail below.
B. CPace
The CPace protocol due to Haase and Labrique was pub-
lished in 2019 [6]. Figure 1 summarizes the protocol. CPace
is essentially a variant of SPEKE with two notable modifi-
cations. First, while SPEKE hashes a password to derive a
base generator, CPace adds more inputs to the hash function
including a sub-session ID (ssid) and a channel identifier (CI).
The ssid is defined to be a random string jointly agreed by
Alice and Bob, and the CI is defined as a concatenation
of the identities of the two parties. A consequence of this
change is that each user needs to know ssid and CI even
before any communication starts. This is clearly unrealistic.
When additional communication is considered to transmit
these values as part of the key exchange process, the actual
round efficiency for CPace is 3 rounds (3 flows). The second
modification is to use a new H2C function (called Map2Point
in Figure 1) to map the output of a hash function to a random
point on a designated elliptic curve. No H2C function is used
in SPEKE, but the protocol [7] is only defined in the FF setting
(see Table I).
C. OPAQUE
The OPAQUE protocol due to Jarecki, Krawczyk and Xu
was published in 2018 [11]. Figure 2 shows a schematic
representation of the OPAQUE protocol. The protocol has two
stages: registration and login. The registration should be done
over a pre-existing secure channel (clearly, if k and ρs are
captured by an eavesdropper, the password pw will be trivially
broken through offline dictionary search). The login is a 2-
round protocol which can be implemented in 2 flows.
While a high-level description of OPAQUE is presented
in the original paper [11], a complete specification of the
protocol is lacking in two aspects. First of all, the protocol
uses Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF) as a basic
Name Type Pub. Original Designer(s) Rnd Exp Mul Rely on Rely on Submitter(s)
(flow) (FF) (EC) H2C TS
SPAKE2 Bal. 2005 Abdalla, Pointcheval [2] 2(2) 3 2 No Yes Kaduk, Ladd
J-PAKE Bal. 2008 Hao, Ryan [8] 2(3) 14 11 No No Hao
SPEKE Bal. 1996 Jablon [9] (revised [7]) 1(2) 2 (×9) U/D No No Harkins
CPace (*) Bal. 2019 Haase, Labrique [6] 3(3) U/D 2 + H2C Yes No Haase
OPAQUE (*) Aug. 2018 Jarecki, Krawczyk, Xu [11] 2(2) U/D C: 2 + H2C + AKES: 2 + AKE Yes No Krawczyk
AuCPace Aug. 2019 Haase, Labrique [6] 4(4) U/D C: 3 + H2CS: 4 + H2C Yes No Haase
VTBPEKE Aug. 2017 Pointcheval, Wang [13] 3(3) 4 4 No Yes Wang
BSPAKE Aug. 2019 Thomas (Email 30/06/19) 3(3) U/D N/A Yes Yes Thomas
TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF CANDIDATES IN THE 2019 IETF PAKE SELECTION. TEXT IN RED REPRESENTS POTENTIAL ISSUES OR DRAWBACKS. (*) MARKS THE
WINNERS OF THE SELECTION PROCESS. IN ALL PROTOCOLS, ONLY IMPLICIT KEY CONFIRM IS CONSIDERED; EXPLICIT KEY CONFIRMATION CAN BE
ACHIEVED BY ADDING ONE MORE ROUND OR FLOW. FOR SPEKE, WE CONSIDER A 2048-BIT SAFE PRIME p AS THE MODULUS, AND THE COST OF ONE
EXPONENTIATION (2047-BIT EXPONENT) mod p IS ABOUT 9 TIMES COSTLY AS AN EXPONENTIATION (224-BIT EXPONENT) IN J-PAKE AND SPAKE2.
FOR OPAQUE AND AUCPACE, WE CONSIDER THE COST FOR LOGIN ONLY (REGISTRATION COST EXCLUDED). U/D REFERS TO “UNDEFINED”. N/A
REFERS TO “NOT AVAILABLE” (DUE TO INCOMPLETE SPECIFICATION).
Alice Bob
g′ = H1(ssid‖PRS‖CI) g′ = H1(ssid‖PRS‖CI)
G = Map2Point(g′) G = Map2Point(g′)
ya ∈R [1,mτ ], Ya = Gya·cτ yb ∈R [1,mτ ], Yb = Gyb·cτ
Ya−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Yb←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
K = Y ya·cτb K = Y
yb·cτ
a
Abort if Yb is invalid Abort if Ya is invalid
sk1 = H2(ssid‖K) sk1 = H2(ssid‖K)
Fig. 1. CPace protocol [6]. H1, H2: two independent hash functions. ssid: sub-session ID. PRS: Password Related String. CI: Channel Identifier. Map2Point:
map a hash output to a group element on a designated elliptic curve. mτ : order of the group. cτ : co-factor.
building block. A critical element in OPRF is a special hash
function H ′ (see Figure 2), which should map a password
to a random group element in constant time. However, no
construction of H ′ is provided in the OPAQUE paper [11].
To fully specify OPAQUE, an ID document (initially called
draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque, and later replaced by draft-irtf-
cfrg-opaque) was created for the PAKE selection process. This
OPAQUE ID document relies on another H2C ID document
(draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve) for the definition of H ′. At the
end of the selection process when OPAQUE was announced
as a winner, none of these ID documents was published. The
specification of OPAQUE remained incomplete and not fixed.
A second building block in OPAQUE is an authenticated
key exchange scheme called KE (see Figure 2). The OPAQUE
paper proposes to use HMQV as the “most efficient” way
to instantiate KE without giving full details. HMQV, as an
AKE primitive, has the issue of being ambiguous on whether
the public key validation is required. The original HMQV
paper states that it is sufficient for each party to check if
a received (static or ephemeral) public key “is not 0 or 1”.
However, this is not the same as the public key validation,
and as a result, the protocol is vulnerable to a small-subgroup
confinement attack [12] as shown by Menezes. The use of
HMQV to instantiate the AKE in OPAQUE was described
in the draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque ID document during the
PAKE reviewing process. After the selection was concluded,
another ID document draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque was created to
replace draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque with the aim to fully spec-
ify OPAQUE in the post-selection time. A Github repository
was also created as a working area (https://github.com/cfrg/
draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque) to continue to specify OPAQUE. In
some of the versions (e.g., draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-3),
public key validation is explicitly mandated in HMQV, but
in later versions, such an explicit statement is removed. This
is potentially confusing. Whether or not public key validation
is required is an important detail in a protocol specification,
which should be consistently and unambiguously stated.
As of October 2020, the use of HMQV was no longer
recommended for OPAQUE (citing patent as a reason); in-
stead, different AKE protocols, namely, 3DH and SIGMA,
were proposed to replace HMQV. Krawczyk clarified this issue
on 28 October 2020 by stating: “It has to be understood
that these AKEs are informational/illustrative, not intended as
full specifications. Having the unspecified/optional info fields
makes it very clear that we are not providing a full speci-
fication” (https://github.com/cfrg/draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque/issues/
77). However, the lack of a full and stable specification has
also made it difficult to precisely analyze the security and
efficiency properties of OPAQUE.
Init registration
U S
pw, ρu ∈R Zq, Pu = gρu k, Ps = gρs←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
k ∈R Zq , ρs ∈R Zq
rw = H(pw,H ′(pw)k)
c = AuthEncrw(ρu,Pu,Ps) c−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Stores k, ρs, c
Login
U (pw) S (k, ρs, c)
r, x ∈R Zq
α = H ′(pw)r, X = gx
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
β = αk, c, Y = gy
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
y ∈R Zq
rw = H(pw, β1/r)
ρu, Pu,P s ← AuthDecrw(c)
K = KE(ρu, x, Ps, Y ) K = KE(ρs, y, Pu, X)
Fig. 2. Schematic representation of OPAQUE [11]. H: a standard one-way hash. H′: a special hash function that maps an arbitrary string to a random group
element. pw: password. AuthEnc: authenticated encryption. AuthDec: authenticated decryption. KE: (authenticated) key exchange.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Reflecting on the IETF PAKE selection process, we present
a set of principles as guidelines to improve security standard-
ization in the future. Although these principles are drawn from
the IETF selection case study, we believe they are generally
applicable, e.g., for the standardization activities in IEEE,
ISO/IEC and NIST as well.
A. Selecting standardization candidates
First of all, we start with seemingly the obvious: the
completeness principle.
Principle 1 (completeness): Be complete with
the system specification. All details should be fully
specified. There should be no dependency on any
external functions that are undefined or incompletely
defined.
In the IETF PAKE selection process, the two winning
protocols, CPace and OPAQUE, critically depended on a H2C
function, which was not appropriately instantiated throughout
the selection process. Nominators of CPace and OPAQUE
assumed that details of this function would be completed by
other people in the future. So did the reviewers. OPAQUE
had a further issue that the AKE instantiation was not fully
defined during the selection process. The full specification was
left as follow-up work to complete in the post-selection time.
We stress that in security, every detail matters. The decision
of choosing a security technique for standardization should be
based on what it is rather than what it might be in the future.
Principle 2 (explicitness): Be explicit with any
properties related to security analysis and implemen-
tation, such as assumptions, system parameters, the
precise sequence of operations etc.
The explictness principle is one of the most important engi-
neering principles in designing robust public key protocols. As
stated by Anderson and Needham in 1995: “Robust security is
about explicitness” [1]. Here, we extend this principle to the
context of security standardization.
One of the prudent practices in the previous PAKE stan-
dardization efforts by IEEE P1363.2 and ISO/IEC 11770-4 is
to explicitly define a PAKE protocol in two separate settings:
FF and EC. Doing so would have avoided the confusion of
mixing these two settings during the evaluation.
Another prudent practice, adopted in the NIST AES selec-
tion process, is to ask nominators to provide reference imple-
mentations. Doing so would have compelled the designers to
fully specify all details in their proposed systems.
CPace explicitly claims to be “one round” (draft-irtf-cfrg-
cpace-1), but makes two implicit assumptions. First, it defines
a random sub-session ID (ssid) and implicitly assumes it is
known by both parties before the communication starts. In fact
this assumption is an artefact from the way the CPace protocol
is defined. In the original paper, there is no explicit specifica-
tion of CPace. CPace is derived from AUCPace by taking a
portion of the key exchange flows. The use of ssid is actually
inherited from the earlier flows in AUCPace. But this context is
lost when CPace is extracted as a standalone protocol. Second,
CPace implicitly assumes each party knows (or “remembers”)
the exact identity to be used by the other party even before
the communication starts. If a party “misremembers” the other
party’s exact identity, the key exchange will fail even if the
two parties have used the same password. This deviates from
the established practice in the field of PAKE research that
user identities are established and verified as part of the key
exchange process rather than being “remembered” by the other
party beforehand.
Principle 3: Be sensible with security proofs. Se-
curity proofs are meaningful only when the system
is fully specified. Also, security proofs need to be
checked, which takes times.
First of all, we stress that security proofs are meaningful
only when the system is fully specified. We use EKE as an
example to illustrate this. EKE is the first PAKE protocol
proposed in 1992 [3]. It works by using a password as a sym-
metric key to encrypt the Diffie-Hellman key exchange items.
However, in 1996, Jaspon reported an offline dictionary attack
against EKE [10]. This attack is caused by the fact that a low-
entropy password is simply too weak to be used as a key for
any symmetric cipher (e.g., AES). At Eurocrypt’00, Bellare,
Pointcheval and Rogaway proposed a formal model for EKE
and applied this formal model to prove that “the two-flow
protocol at the core of EKE is a secure AKE [Authenticated
Key Exchange]” [5]. However, the formal security proofs in
the BPR model require an “ideal cipher”. It is assumed that this
“ideal cipher” does not leak any information even when a weak
key is used (hence avoiding the attack reported by Jaspon). It is
further assumed that this cipher works like a random function
in encryption, but must map fixed-sized strings to group
elements in decryption [4]. Clearly, no such cipher existed.
Nonetheless, during the IEEE P1363.2 standardization project
(2000-2008), many people believed that the core problem
in EKE had been solved with formal security proofs, hence
the remaining (simpler) problem was only to instantiate an
“ideal cipher”. Unfortunately, this proved much harder than
what many had hoped. No secure instantiation of this “ideal
cipher” had been found in the next 8 years. In the end, EKE
was not included into IEEE P1363.2 when the project was
concluded in 2008. Even today, this “ideal cipher” in EKE
remains uninstantiated.
Second, we emphasize the importance of the fact that
security proofs need to be checked, which unfortunately has
been neglected by many. We use SPEKE as an example to
illustrate this. SPEKE is one of the most well-known PAKE
protocols, and is included in IEEE P1363.2 and ISO/IEC
11770-4 standards. The original SPEKE protocol [9] was
proposed in 1996 with no security proofs. Concerns on a lack
of security proofs were raised during the IEEE P1363.2 stan-
dardization process. To address this issue, in 2001, MacKenzie
published a paper on IACR ePrint (2001/057) with a formal
model and security proofs to show that SPEKE is “provably
secure”. Although IACR ePrint is not a formal publication,
this paper was included in IEEE P1363.2 (2008) and ISO/IEC
11770-4 (2006) to support that SPEKE had formal security
proofs. However, in 2014, Hao and Shahandashti pointed out
two attacks on the “standardized” version of SPEKE in IEEE
P1363.2 and ISO/IEC 11770-4:2006. Apparently, what was
proved in MacKenzie’s paper was actually a modified version
of SPEKE (e.g., details in the key flows are different and
key confirmation is mandatory rather than optional). Hence,
the formal security proofs were simply not applicable to the
versions defined in the IEEE and ISO/IEC standards. This
apparent discrepancy had not be found for 13 years.
Both the CPace and OPAQUE protocols claim to have
formal security proofs in a universally composable (UC)
model. However, neither protocol was fully specified. The
underlying assumption in the security proofs for the “1-round
CPace” is that each party knows the ssid and the other
party’s exact identity to be used before key exchange. This
assumption is clearly unrealistic. In OPAQUE, details of the
AKE instantiation are not explicitly defined and fixed. Both
protocols also critically depended on H2C, which remained
uninstantiated throughout the selection process. In the absence
of these security-critical details in a full system specification,
the security proofs have limited value.
Principle 4: Do not sidestep the scrutiny of time.
Time is needed for any new security system to ma-
ture before it can be considered for standardization.
A prudent practice in the ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 standard-
ization of security techniques is that any technique nominated
for standardization should meet the requirement of having
received sufficient time of public scrutiny, typically at least 3
years from the date of the first publication. It is reasonable
to expect that the specification of a security technique be
complete, stable and published in public domain for sufficient
time before it can be considered for standardization.
We note that in the IETF selection process, both the CPace
and OPAQUE protocols had only about 1 year public scrutiny
time since their first publication. The short time of public
scrutiny was further compounded by the fact that neither
protocol was fully specified in the original publication. The
specifications kept evolving and were not finalized even when
the selection process was concluded.
V. MANAGING SELECTION PROCESS
Principle 5: Be careful with modifying require-
ments. Do not underestimate the difficulty of for-
mulating a requirement rigorously.
As part of the nomination for BSPAKE, Thomas added
a new requirement for PAKE, namely, “quantum annoying”.
From Thomas, “This property means that quantum computers
need to solve a DLP [Discrete Logarithm Problem] for each
password guess.” This requirement was never considered be-
fore in the PAKE research field, but became one of the main
considerations for the PAKE selection. Although questions on
the rigor of this requirement were raised, the CFRG review
panel still listed “quantum annoying” as one of the questions
to be considered, hence, implicitly endorsing this requirement.
CPace claims to fulfill this requirement. OPAQUE also claims
to fulfill this requirement with simple changes (using quantum-
resistant primitives for OPRF and AKE).
However, the so-called “quantum annoying” requirement is
not rigorously defined at all. First of all, it assumes a quantum
computer, which by definition can solve a DLP efficiently
in polynomial time. Under this assumption, all the submitted
PAKE protocols are trivially broken. Suppose we have two
protocols: A and B. An attacker is required to solve 1 DLP
to break the password in Protocol A, but is required to solve
2 DLPs (or a polynomial number) to break the password in
Protocol B. Which protocol is more secure? One might be
tempted to think Protocol B is more secure as it requires more
effort from the attacker. But actually neither protocol is secure
in a quantum setting. This is similar to arguing whether a poly-
alphabetic cipher is more secure than a mono-alphabetic cipher
when the attacker has access to a computer. Both ciphers are
trivially broken. Arguing which one is more secure between
two broken ciphers is not meaningful.
Principle 6: Be careful with modifying a security
technique. A small change is never small, and it can
cause profound effects.
Questions on the ssid and round-efficiency problems of
CPace were raised during the first round of the selection
process. However, instead of addressing these questions, the
CFRG review panel chose CPace into the second round with
a request to CPace designers to modify the protocol “without
negotiation of sid”. This request had remained unfulfilled til
the end of the second round. Nonetheless, the CPace protocol
was still chosen as a winner. The issues on ssid, user identities,
and H2C were simply left as follow-up works to complete in
the post-selection time.
Principle 7: Be careful with majority voting. Efforts
should be made to converge disagreements into a
broad consensus, and ensure all issues are fully
addressed before any decisions are made.
In each of the two rounds during the PAKE selection
process, the CFRG review panel published four reviews from
the four voluntary members based on the comments collected
from other people. These four reviews were written separately,
and were not consistent. For example, among the final four
reviews, although 3 out of 4 members preferred CPace, one
member (Tackmann) stated that “it would be prudent for
CFRG to re-evaluate the proof support after the now-discussed
modification to be chosen protocol (e.g., choice of session
id for CPACE, ...) are finalized.” Rather than addressing
the disparity, the panel simply announced winners based on
majority voting. Any unaddressed technical issues were left
as follow-up works.
Here, we do not question the use of majority voting as a
decision method, but we stress that this method should be
exercised with care based on appropriate conditions. In fact,
all the issues discussed in the paper were raised during the
PAKE selection process. It should be the panel’s responsibil-
ity to spend efforts to converge disagreements into a broad
consensus, and to ensure all raised issues are fully addressed
before any final decision is made. In the absence of such
efforts, the outcome of majority voting is not meaningful.
Furthermore, when majority voting is exercised, the voting
population should be reasonably sized. In the IETF PAKE
selection, there were only four voters. (Recall in the final round
of the AES selection process, there were 212 votes.)
Finally, we emphasize the importance of having a report
from the organization committee when the selection process
is concluded. In the previous AES selection process, a report
from NIST was published for each of the two rounds to
summarize the findings and to justify the decisions. However,
during the IETF selection process, no panel report was pro-
vided for any of the two rounds during the selection. The
absence of a coherent report from the panel to explain the
rationale of the decision is a missed opportunity in the IETF
PAKE selection process to reflect on the questions raised and
make sure they have been all appropriately addressed before
committing to the decision.
VI. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS
Why sound principles were bypassed? Having a complete,
stable and unambiguous specification is a sound requirement
for the standardization of any security technique. As an
example, in the “Submission Requirements and Evaluation
Criteria for the Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization
Process” document published by NIST in 2016, it states:
“A complete written specification of the algorithms shall be
included, consisting of all necessary mathematical operations,
equations, tables, and diagrams that are needed to imple-
ment the algorithms.” The same requirement is stated in the
lightweight cryptography standardization process announced
by NIST in 2018. However, why was this prudent practice
somehow sidestepped during the IETF selection process? Both
CPace and OPAQUE claim to be provably secure in a UC
model, which is argued by many to be the strongest theoretical
model for key agreement. To a layman, the notion of provable
security implies security with certainty. One might think if
a protocol has been mathematically proven secure, it should
be instantly ready for standardization; any remaining issues
should be minor and can be left to implementers to address.
However, in the example of CPace and OPAQUE, the fact
that provable security in a strong UC model can be claimed
based on abstract building blocks without fully specifying
all details has significantly complicated the matter (see the
earlier discussion on the ideal-cipher model in the formal
proof of EKE as another example). During the PAKE selection,
while extensive efforts were spent on reviewing the UC formal
model and the proofs for CPace and OPAQUE, little attention
was paid to more fundamental questions such as whether the
assumptions made in the model are actually reasonable and
whether the protocol is fully specified. When people overly
rely on security proofs (see Principle 3), they also tend to
neglect other principles. We refer the reader to Herley and
Oorschot [15] for the important separation of inductive and
deductive statements, which explains the root cause for many
misunderstandings on provable security from the perspective
of the philosophy of science.
Why CPace and OPAQUE were chosen as winners? As
the panel did not write a report, we cannot give the full
picture. Still, the following elements were brought up during
the relevant discussions. First of all, the reliance on a trusted
setup (a potential backdoor) was commonly considered by
CFRG members to be inadequate for a large-scale deployment
of PAKE, which removes SPAKE2, VTBPEKE and BSPAKE.
The “one round-trip” requirement stated by Barnes and Friel
removes J-PAKE. When nominating SPEKE, Harkins did
not specify which exact SPEKE variant was nominated. The
nomination contains a reference to Hao-Shahandashti’s revised
SPEKE in 2014 [7] (standardized in ISO/IEC 11770-4:2016)
but also refers to MacKenzie’s 2001 IACR paper (2001/057)
for the security proofs. However, the SPEKE protocol specifi-
cations in these papers are different. This ambiguity was never
clarified by the nominator throughout the selection process,
which caused confusion among the reviewers and eventually
the SPEKE candidate falling out of favor. This leaves CPace
as the only balanced PAKE, and AuCPace and OPAQUE
as two remaining augmented PAKEs. A crucial reason for
CPace to be chosen as a winner is that it claims to be one-
round (but as explained earlier, this is based on incorrect
assumptions). Between AuCPace and OPAQUE, the latter
was preferred by panel members. OPAQUE’s pre-computation
resistance property was perceived by some as an advantage
over alternative schemes.
Current status of CPace and OPAQUE. As of June 2021
(more than one year after the selection process was finished),
the H2C ID remains a draft (draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve).
Both CPace and OPAQUE assume H2C as an idealized random
function that returns a non-identity point (a generator) in the
prime-order subgroup on an elliptic curve given a password
(together with auxiliary public data) as input. In the latest
H2C ID (v11), the H2C functions defined in the draft do
not preclude small subgroup points in the output by design.
The chance of falling into a small subgroup is negligible, but
not zero. This shows a subtle but clear mismatch between
the idealized assumption of H2C and what is provided by
the actual construction. CPace continues to be specified in
an ID (draft-irtf-cfrg-cpace). In the latest version (v1), the
designers have changed the user identities (CI; see Figure 1)
to be “optional” rather than “mandatory” and the ssid to
be “unilateral” rather than “bidirectional”. These are material
changes to the protocol specification from its original form [6].
The security proof in the original CPace paper claims to be
based on a computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption.
However, this claim was disputed during the PAKE selection
process. As a result, the assumption has been changed to
“Computational Simultaneous Diffie-Hellman” in draft-irtf-
cfrg-cpace-01 after the selection process was finished, and
subsequently further changed to “Strong simultaneous non-
uniform CDH” (and additionally, “Strong twist CDH” for
certain elliptic curves) in the updated version of CPace in
IACR ePrint 2021/114. OPAQUE continues to be specified
in an ID (draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque). In the latest version (v5),
the designers have changed to use 3DH to instantiate AKE,
which is different from what was originally proposed [11],
nominated and reviewed during the PAKE selection process.
The use of HMQV is now included in the appendix of the
ID; still, it remains unclear whether public key validation
in HMQV should be mandatory or not. It has also been
identified that the transmission of c during the login phase
(see Figure 2) leaks information about whether a password
has been recently changed, which can cause security concerns
in certain applications. It is possible to stop this leakage by
running OPAQUE over SSL/TLS, but that will contradict the
basic goal of PAKE: removing dependence on a PKI.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a retrospective review of a
recent IETF PAKE selection process. Although the process
had finished with the two winners announced, we highlighted
a number of technical issues with the two winning protocols
which had remained unaddressed even after the selection
process was concluded. Aspects concerning the management
of the selection process were also reviewed. The unaddressed
issues added risks and uncertainties to the success of the
standardization process, which could have been avoided in
the first place. Based on this review, we presented a set of
principles with the hope to help improve the standardization
of security techniques in the future.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We thank anonymous reviewers for many helpful comments.
We thank Paul van Oorschot, Ross Anderson, Liqun Chen, and
Rene Struik for invaluable feedback and discussions.
REFERENCES
[1] R.J. Anderson, R. Needham, “Robustness principles for public key
protocols,” Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology
Conference on Advances in Cryptology, LNCS 963, pp. 236–247, 1995.
[2] M. Abdalla, D. Pointcheval, “Simple password-based encrypted key
exchange protocols,” Proceedings of Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA,
pp. 191–20, 2005.
[3] S. Bellovin and M. Merritt, “Encrypted Key Exchange: password-based
protocols secure against dictionary attacks,” Proceedings of the IEEE
Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, May 1992.
[4] C. Boyd, A. Mathuria, Protocols for authentication and key establish-
ment, Springer-Verlag, 2003.
[5] M. Bellare, D. Pointcheval, P. Rogaway, “Authenticated key exchange
secure against dictionary attacks,” Eurocrypt’00, LNCS 1807, pp.
139–155, 2000.
[6] B. Haase, B. Labrique, “AuCPace: Efficient verifier-based PAKE proto-
col tailored for the IIoT,” IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware
and Embedded Systems, pp. 1–48, Vol. 2019, No. 2, 2019.
[7] F. Hao, R. Metere, S. Shahandashti and C. Dong, “Analysing and Patch-
ing SPEKE in ISO/IEC,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics
and Security, Vol. 13, No. 11, pp. 2844-2855, 2018.
[8] F. Hao, and P. Ryan, “Password authenticated key exchange by juggling,”
International Workshop on Security Protocols (SPW), 2008.
[9] D. Jablon, “Strong password-only authenticated key exchange,” ACM
Computer Communications Review, Vol. 26, No. 5, pp. 5–26, October
1996.
[10] B. Jaspan, “Dual-workfactor Encrypted Key Exchange: efficiently pre-
venting password chaining and dictionary attacks,” Proceedings of the
Sixth Annual USENIX Security Conference, pp. 43-50, July 1996.
[11] S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and J. Xu, “OPAQUE: an asymmetric PAKE
protocol secure against pre-computation attacks,” In Advances in Cryp-
tology - EUROCRYPT 2018, pp. 456–486, Springer, 2018.
[12] A. Menezes, “Another Look At HMQV,” Journal of Mathematical
Cryptology, Vol. 1, No 1, pp. 47–64, 2007.
[13] D. Pointcheval and G. Wang, “VTBPEKE: Verifier-based Two-Basis
Password Exponential Key Exchange,” Proceedings of the 2017 ACM
Symposium on Information, computer and communications security
(AsiaCCS), 2017.
[14] M. Abdalla, F. Benhamouda, P. MacKenzie, “Security of the J-PAKE
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol,” Proceedings of IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2015.
[15] C. Herley, P.C. van Oorschot, “SoK: Science, Security, and the Elusive
Goal of Security as a Scientific Pursuit,” Proceedings of IEEE Sympo-
sium on Security and Privacy, 2017.
